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6.1  Introduction 
The technology-related activities of multinational corporations generate in- 
terest among policymakers and many others who are concerned about the per- 
formance of national economies. Government opinion may be divided over the 
tactics to use in attracting new technologies, but there is seldom disagreement 
over the goals of enhancing national productivity through technological devel- 
opment. The statistical evidence generally supports the conclusion that the 
economic benefits of R&D activity extend to local firms other than those un- 
dertaking the  R&D.'  Since  there  are  reasons  to  expect  that  externality- 
generating R&D activities may be underprovided by markets in which devel- 
opers of new technologies do not capture all of the economic benefits that the 
technologies provide, various governments offer R&D-related tax subsidies.* 
James R. Hines, Jr., is associate professor of public policy at the John F.  Kennedy School of 
Government of Harvard University and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research. 
The author thanks Jeffrey Geppert for outstanding research assistance, and Adam Jaffe and 
James Poterba for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Financial support from the National Sci- 
ence Foundation (grant SES-9209373) and NBER is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. See Griliches 1991 and Nadiri 1993 for surveys of empirical measures of productivity spill- 
overs from R&D activities. 
2. In theory, the welfare consequences of subsidizing R&D are ambiguous, because competitive 
pressures might generate too much R&D in certain industries in the absence of a subsidy, and 
because foreign competitors may benefit from domestic subsidies (or in other ways influence the 
domestic market). See Dixit  1988 and Reinganum  1989 for surveys of the theory. The  United 
States introduced the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit, and increased the tax deductibil- 
ity of the R&D expenses of certain multinational corporations, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981. This legislation appears to have been motivated by consideration of economic externali- 
ties, though the focus of congressional sentiment as described in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee 
on Taxation 1981 is on comparison of  U.S. research intensity with the research intensities of 
other countries. 
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Governments that do not offer R&D tax subsidies are often concerned that 
perhaps they should. There are, however, many open questions about the im- 
pact of tax policy on the level of R&D. 
Tax systems influence the level and content of R&D activity through a vari- 
ety of channels. This paper focuses on R&D by  multinational firms, and the 
impact of one particular set of taxes: withholding taxes on cross-border royalty 
payments. Firms that develop new  technologies in their home countries and 
use the technologies in foreign locations are required to pay royalties from 
foreign affiliates to domestic parent companies. Governments tax these royalty 
payments. High tax rates make royalties, and the technology imports that they 
accompany, more expensive for the foreign affiliates that pay the taxes. 
In theory, higher costs of imported technology might encourage or discour- 
age local R&D by affiliates of multinational corporations. The difference turns 
on the nature of production within multinational firms. One possibility is that 
firms use local R&D jointly with imported technology to produce goods for 
sale. As an example, it may often be the case that firms need to complement 
imported technologies with local research efforts that tailor products and pro- 
cesses to local needs. A second possibility is that firms substitute local R&D 
for imported technologies, as is the case when a certain amount of technologi- 
cal development can be done either at home or abroad. 
If  local R&D is complementary to imported technology, then high royalty 
tax rates should discourage local R&D,  while if local R&D is a substitute for 
imported technology, then high royalty tax rates should encourage local R&D. 
There are two objectives of the work presented in this paper. The first is to 
identify the degree to which R&D activity by  multinational firms is sensitive 
to local tax conditions. The second objective is to determine whether imported 
technology and local R&D are complements or substitutes. 
The results suggest that R&D responds significantly to local tax rates, and 
that local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. These results appear 
both in the behavior of American investors in other countries, and in the behav- 
ior of  foreign investors in the United States. Firms appear to react to high 
royalty tax rates by  paying fewer royalties and performing additional R&D 
locally. To the extent that royalty payments reflect actual technology transfer 
(rather than adept accounting practices), the behavior of  multinational firms 
implies that local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. 
Section 6.2 briefly describes the tax treatment of multinational firms, pay- 
ing particular attention to technology-related issues. Section 6.3 analyzes the 
R&D incentives created by international taxation, and describes the data that 
serve as the basis of the empirical work. Section 6.4 describes the statistical 
evidence on the reaction of  R&D levels to royalty tax rates. Section 6.5 is 
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6.2  Multinational Firms, Taxation, and International 
Technology Transfer 
This section examines the role of multinational firms in international tech- 
nology transfer, and reviews the tax treatment of R&D expenditures and roy- 
alty receipts by multinational firms. 
6.2.1  International Technology Transfer 
There is considerable interest in understanding the role that multinational 
firms play in transferring technologies across borders. There are two methods 
by  which multinational firms provide  new  technologies to the countries in 
which they invest. The first method is to develop new technologies locally, 
through R&D or other similar type of activity. The second method is to import 
technologies produced elsewhere. 
The foreign affiliates of American firms use both methods to bring techno- 
logies to the countries in which they operate, and sufficient information exists 
to assess quantitatively the relative significance of each method. Direct infor- 
mation on the R&D activities of the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms is reported 
in surveys conducted by the U.S. Commerce Department. Information on tech- 
nology imports by these affiliates is considerably sketchier. One can, however, 
infer the approximate magnitude of technology imports from royalties paid by 
the affiliates to U.S. parent firms and third parties in other countries, since 
royalty payments should, in principle, reflect the values of  imported techno- 
logies. 
Table  6.1  reports  detailed information about  the  aggregate technology- 
Table 6.1  R&D and Royalty Activity of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. 
Multinationals 
1982  1989 
(millions of current $)  (millions of current $) 
R&D expenditures, total 
R&D by affiliate for itself 
R&D by affiliate for others 
Royalty receipts, total 
From U.S. parents 
From other foreign affiliates 
From unaffiliated Americans 
From unaffiliated foreigners 
To U.S. parents 
To other foreign affiliates 
To unaffiliated Americans 
To  unaffiliated foreigners 



























Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1985, 1992. 
Note: Data cover majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. 54  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
related behavior of the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in 1982 and 1989. It is 
noteworthy that these affiliates paid more in royalties to their parent firms ($9.8 
billion in 1989) than they spent on R&D ($7.9 billion in 1989), though, as the 
table indicates, there was extensive use of both methods of technology acquisi- 
tion. The survey distinguishes two categories of R&D expenditure: R&D by 
affiliates for themselves, and R&D by affiliates for others (the latter of which 
is R&D performed on a contract basis). R&D by affiliates for themselves con- 
stitutes roughly 80 percent of their total R&D expenditures. 
American firms spend a considerable amount of money on R&D performed 
in foreign countries, but in recent years, foreign-owned firms have spent even 
more than that on R&D performed in the United States. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the R&D expenditure levels of  foreign affiliates of  U.S. firms and foreign- 
owned firms in the United States over the 1977-90  period. Due to the R&D 
intensity of the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world, and the strength 
of  foreign direct investment into the United States since 1973, foreign firms 
have spent more on R&D inside the United States than American firms have 
spent on R&D outside the United States in every year since 1982, and the gap 
between the two expenditure levels is ~idening.~ 
There is considerable interest in the role of multinational firms in transfer- 
ring technology across borders, and the impact that government policy can 
have on the rate and direction of technology transfer. Though these issues have 
been extensively studied:  one of  the open questions is the degree to which 
imported technology is a substitute or complement for local R&D. 
6.2.2  The Tax Treatment of R&D Expenditures and Royalty Receipts 
The appendix to this volume describes the general features of the U.S. sys- 
tem of taxing the foreign incomes of American corporations. American multi- 
national firms that perform R&D in the United States intending to use the 
resulting technology both in the United States and abroad face a particularly 
complex tax treatment of their transactions. Since passage of the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986, American multinationals are no longer allowed to deduct 100 
percent of their U.S. R&D expenses against their U.S. tax liabilities. Instead, 
U.S. law requires American firms to allocate R&D expenses between U.S. and 
3. Exchange rate fluctuations can confound the interpretation of figure 6. I, since changes in the 
value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies affect the dollar-denominated relative magnitudes 
of R&D performed in the United States and abroad, even if nominal expenditures are unchanged. 
This consideration is not significant in this case, however, since a simple adjustment for the chang- 
ing value of the dollar relative to a trade-weighted average of foreign currencies produces a figure 
that very closely resembles figure 6.1. 
4. See, for example, Teece 1976; Germidis 1977; Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo 1979; Mansfield 
and Romeo 1980; Davidson and McFetridge 1984; Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Kravis 1990; Zejan 
1990; Blomstrom 1991; Ethier and Markusen 1991; Wang and Blomstrom 1992; and Blomstrom 
and Kokko  1993. These studies together consider the effect of  a large number of  variables on 
technology transfer and R&D activity, though they do not consider the effect of royalty tax rates 









Fig. 6.1  R&D by foreign firms in the United States, and by American firms 
abroad, 1977-1990 
Sources: US.  Department of Commerce, Bureau of  Economic  Analysis, various issues; National 
Science Foundation 1993. 
Nore: The vertical scale measures billions of current dollars of annual R&D expenditures.  Darkly 
shaded bars represent total R&D expenditures of foreign-owned firms in the United States. Lightly 
shaded bars represent total R&D expenditures of foreign affiliates of American firms. 
foreign sources, based on the fraction of  a firm’s sales that are f~reign.~  The 
practical importance of this system is that firms with excess foreign tax credits 
receive usable tax deductions for only a fraction (equal to the ratio of domestic 
sales to total worldwide sales) of  their U.S.  R&D expenses. This system is 
based on the idea that multinational firms performing R&D in  the United 
States use only a fraction of the output of their R&D activities to enhance their 
sales in the United States, and consequently, that only a fraction of their R&D 
costs should be deductible against U.S.-source income. 
Royalties received by American parent firms for R&D used abroad represent 
taxable foreign-source income of the American firms. American firms with 
deficit foreign tax credits must pay U.S. income tax on these royalty receipts, 
while firms with excess foreign tax credits can apply the excess credits against 
U.S. taxes due on the royalties, thereby eliminating the U.S. tax liability cre- 
ated by the royalty receipts. 
Most of the world’s governments impose withholding taxes on cross-border 
5. See Hines 1993, 1994 for descriptions of the precise formulas used and quantitative assess- 
ments of their impact on R&D spending levels. 56  James R. Hines, Jr. 
royalty payments from affiliates located within their countries. These royalty 
tax rates are frequently reduced according to the terms of bilateral tax treaties. 
For example, the United States imposes a 30 percent tax on royalties paid to 
foreign corporations, but this tax rate is often reduced, in some cases to zero, 
when recipients of royalty payments are located in countries with whom the 
United States has a tax treaty in force. 
6.3  Framework and Data 
This section analyzes the R&D incentives created by  systems of  interna- 
tional taxation, and describes the data that serve as the basis of the statistical 
work. 
6.3.1  R&D Incentives 
Consider a multinational firm that establishes a foreign affiliate to produce 
and sell goods in the foreign country in which the affiliate is located.6 The 
affiliate generates sales using local inputs of  capital, labor, and intermediate 
products; in addition, the affiliate uses technology from its parent and the tech- 
nology it generates on its own to produce goods for sale. 
American tax law and the tax laws of most other countries require that for- 
eign affiliates pay  rents or royalties to their parent firms for the fair market 
value of  technologies transferred from the parent firms to the affiliates.’ In 
practice, of course, it is frequently difficult to establish the fair market value 
of technology transferred from one party to another within a controlled group, 
since there may exist no market prices for the types of technology in question. 
In such circumstances, tax-avoiding firms that transfer technology from the 
parent to its foreign affiliates often have incentives to select royalty payments 
that transfer taxable income out of high-tax  jurisdictions and into low-tax juris- 
dictions. Governments are aware of this incentive, and try to use their enforce- 
ment power to prevent royalties from deviating too greatly from reasonable 
values. 
One way to describe government enforcement efforts is to consider the addi- 
tional costs that firms bear when royalties deviate from market values. These 
include costs that firms incur in justifying their royalty declarations to tax au- 
thorities. If  these adjustment costs rise sufficiently with the deviations of re- 
6. This analysis abstracts from the possibility that the activities of  foreign affiliates directly 
enhance the sales of their domestic parent firm. One of the practical difficulties that American 
firms encounter in such situations is that royalties paid by  U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates 
are severely tax-disadvantaged. See Hines 1994 for a discussion of this issue. 
7. Of the twenty-five industrialized countries surveyed by  Lawlor (1983, twenty-four apply 
the arm’s-length principle to the taxation of related-party transactions; Hong Kong is the lone 
exception. 
8. For evidence on the overall effectiveness of transfer price enforcement,  see Kopits  1976; 
Grubert and Mutti 1991; Harris et al. 1993; and Hines and Rice 1994. 57  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
ported royalties from market values, then they will ultimately limit the degrees 
to which firms modify royalty payments simply for tax purposes. 
Enforcement efforts that require firms to pay royalties equal to market values 
of technology transfers also mean that taxes on royalty payments should affect 
the volume of technology transfers. As long as there is a positive relationship 
between royalty payments and technology transfers, higher royalty taxes raise 
the cost of transferred technology, and may encourage local firms to undertake 
their own R&D as a substitute for imported technology. 
6.3.2  Data 
There are two available sources of detailed information on the R&D activi- 
ties of  multinational firms located in a large number of  countries. The first 
source is the 1989 Benchmark Survey of  the Bureau of  Economic Analysis 
(BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. This survey, the results of which 
are reported in U.S. Department of Commerce 1992, is the most recent com- 
prehensive survey of the activities of the foreign affiliates of American multi- 
national firms. The survey covers activities during 1989. In order to protect the 
confidentiality of survey respondents, BEA does not divulge the responses of 
individual firms, and reports country aggregates only for those countries in 
which there are sufficient numbers of U.S. firms with sizable activities so that 
aggregate figures do not reveal information about individual firms. Useful 
R&D and royalty data are available for affiliates in forty-three foreign coun- 
tries for 1989. 
The second source of information is the 1987 survey of foreign direct invest- 
ment in the United States, reported in U.S. Department of Commerce 1990. 
This survey describes the activities of foreign-owned firms in the United States 
during 1987. Due to data suppressions and other limitations, useful data are 
available on investors from twenty-seven countries during 1987. 
The goal of the statistical work is to examine the relationship between roy- 
alty tax rates and levels of R&D activity, both for American firms investing in 
foreign countries and for foreign firms investing in the United States. The dif- 
ficulty that such a study encounters is that R&D levels differ for reasons that 
have nothing to do with tax rates. One nontax factor that is clearly associated 
with R&D spending is the degree of R&D intensity in the countries in which 
multinational firms have operations. The foreign affiliates of American multi- 
nationals located in countries whose economies are R&D-intensive tend to 
perform more R&D than do affiliates located in other countries. Similarly, 
foreign-owned affiliates in the United States tend to invest more in R&D if 
their parent firms are located in technology-intensive  countries. 
Information is available from the National Science Foundation (1991) on 
the R&D intensities of  a large number of  countries. The National Science 
Foundation constructs indices that reflect national R&D/GNP ratios; due to 
data limitations, these ratios are not all calculated using data for the same year, 58  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 6.2  R&D Expenditure as  a Percentage of GNP, 1961-1989 
West 






























1.4  - 
1.5  1.2 
1.6  1.4 
1.8  1.6 
2.0  1.7 
2.1  1.8 
2.2  2.0 
2.1  2.0 
2.0  1.8 
1.9  2.1 
1.9  2.2 
1.9  2.2 
1.8  2.1 
1.8  2.1 
1.8  2.2 
1.8  2.1 
1.8  2.1 
1.8  2.2 
1.8  2.4 
1.8  2.4 
2.0  2.5 
2.1  2.6 
2.1  2.6 
2.2  2.6 
2.3  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.3  2.9 
2.3  2.9 






























United  United 
Kingdom  States 
2.5  2.7 
-  2.7 
2.8 
2.3  2.9 
-  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.2  2.8 
2.3  2.7 
-  2.6 
-  2.4 
2.1  2.4 
-  2.3 
-  2.2 
2.1  2.2 
-  2.2 
-  2.2 
2.2  2.1 
-  2.2 
2.3 
2.4  2.4 
-  2.5 
2.2  2.6 
-  2.7 
2.3  2.8 
2.4  2.8 
2.3  2.8 
2.2  2.7 
2.0  2.1 
- 
- 
Source: National Science Foundation 1991. 
Note: French data are based on gross domestic product (GDP); consequently, percentages may be 
slightly overstated compared to GNP. Omissions (-)  indicate that R&D data are unavailable. 
though most observations represent the period 1986-88.9  In the empirical in- 
vestigations, the variables that influence R&D demand are interacted with 
these country-level measures of  R&D intensity. This procedure represents a 
simple, if rather unsubtle, adjustment for differences among countries in the 
extent to which their firms undertake R&D. Local R&D intensity can have an 
important impact on the demand for imported technology as well, so the R&D 
intensity variable appears in the royalty equations. 
9. R&D/GNP ratios change little from year to year, as evidenced by the time-series data on 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States presented in table 6.2 These 
economies, which are among the most R&D-intensive in the world, exhibit only gradual move- 
ments in R&D intensity relative to each other. 59  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
Information on tax systems and tax rates is reported by  Price Waterhouse 
(various issues). In the empirical investigations, firms are assumed to face ef- 
fective tax rates on their technology-related activities equal to statutory corpo- 
rate tax rates in host countries. 
6.4  Responsiveness of R&D Activity to Tax Rates 
This section describes the evidence on the responsiveness of R&D activity 
to royalty tax rates. Wo  sources of information are considered: information on 
the behavior of American-owned affiliates in foreign countries, and informa- 
tion on the behavior of foreign-owned affiliates in the United States. 
6.4.1 
Evidence reported in Hines 1995 indicates that American-owned affiliates 
in foreign countries that tax royalties heavily tend to pay fewer royalties (mea- 
sured as a fraction of total sales) to their parent firms than do other affiliates. 
These results control for the technological intensity of host countries in which 
affiliates are located. The implied elasticity of royalty payments with respect 
to the royalty tax rate, evaluated at the sample mean, is approximately -0.4. 
This figure implies that, when royalty tax rates double,I0  royalty payments fall 
(relative to sales) by 40 percent. 
At  least part of  the responsiveness of  royalty payments to local tax rates 
corresponds to changes in the use of imported technology. The complexity of 
determining appropriate royalty payments for a variety of intangible property 
that firms transfer across borders, along with taxpayers' natural incentives to 
minimize their own tax liabilities, makes reported royalties a somewhat noisy 
measure of the amount of technology that firms import. Nevertheless, royalty 
payments should correspond, even if  only loosely, to the value of technology 
imports; the evidence suggests that they respond negatively to higher tax rates. 
There are two ways to assess the impact of royalty tax rates on the R&D 
activities of the foreign affiliates of American multinationals. The first way is 
to examine the degree to which the ratio of  R&D expenses by  American- 
owned affiliates to  their labor expenses appears to respond  to royalty tax 
rates." The evidence, reported in Hines 1995, indicates that higher royalty tax 
Foreign Affiliates of American Multinational Corporations 
10. The mean royalty tax rate facing the foreign affiliates of  American multinationals is 20 
percent; hence, doubling the tax rate implies a change from 20 percent to 40 percent. 
11. R&D expenditures are scaled by labor compensation in manufacturing. Manufacturing af- 
filiates account for about 90 percent of the foreign R&D activity of multinational firms. Labor 
compensation is chosen as the denominator because both labor and R&D expenses share the fea- 
ture of immediate deductibility for tax purposes. Of course, some countries (including the United 
States) offer tax credits and other inducements to firms that perform R&D (and in some cases to 
firms that hire labor). A brief survey of country practices indicates, however, that sizable R&D 
subsidies are rare (for example, see Hall  1993 for an analysis of the magnitude of the marginal 
subsidy provided R&D in the United States by the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit), and 
that the primary subsidy comes from the immediate deductibility of R&D expenses that almost all 
industrialized countries provide. 60  James R. Hines, Jr. 
rates are associated with greater R&D intensities. The estimated elasticity of 
responsiveness is 0.16, which implies that doubling the royalty tax rate is asso- 
ciated with 16 percent higher R&D expenditures, controlling for other factors 
(such as the technological intensity of the local economy). Local R&D appears 
to be a substitute for imported technology. 
There is a second way to measure the impact of royalty tax rates on the R&D 
activities of the foreign affiliates of American multinationals, one that exploits 
the distinction between total R&D performed by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms 
and that part of R&D performed by  foreign affiliates of U.S. firms for their 
own use. The latter differs from the former because foreign affiliates of U.S. 
firms do some R&D on contract for others. Under the assumption that imported 
technology does not influence R&D performed for other parties, it is possible 
to compare R&D performed for an affiliate’s own use to R&D performed for 
other parties, in order to infer the impact of royalty tax rates on R&D for own 
use. The advantage of this technique is that the level of R&D performed for 
other parties reflects and controls for nontax  factors that  might otherwise 
threaten to confound the analysis. The results, reported in Hines 1995, indicate 
that, once again, local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. The esti- 
mated elasticity of  responsiveness is now 0.11, which implies that doubling 
the royalty tax rate is associated with  11 percent higher R&D expenditures, 
controlling for R&D performed for other parties. This estimated elasticity dif- 
fers little from the 0.16 elasticity estimated using the first method. 
6.4.2  Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the United States 
The behavior of foreign-owned affiliates  in the United States offers additional 
evidellce on the responsiveness of R&D activity to royalty tax rates. This evi- 
dence must, however, be interpreted with caution, owing to heterogeneous cir- 
cumstances of foreign firms that invest in the United States and the small sample 
size of twenty-seven foreign countries for which sufficient data are available. 
Evidence on the behavior of foreign-owned affiliates in the United States 
yields conclusions that are very similar to those that emerge from the behavior 
of  the foreign affiliates of  American corporations. Foreign investors in the 
United States pay  fewer royalties, and use more R&D-intensive operations, 
when they face higher tax rates on royalties paid to their home countries. The 
small number of countries that constitute major foreign investors makes statis- 
tical inference difficult, but the estimated coefficients are statistically signifi- 
cant at usual levels of  confidence, and in fact, the estimated responsiveness 
(reported in Hines 1995) is somewhat larger than that for the foreign affiliates 
of American corporations. 
6.5  Conclusion 
This paper describes information on the behavior of the foreign affiliates of 
U.S. firms and foreign-owned affiliates in the United States to estimate the 61  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
relationship between technology imports and local R&D. The idea is to use 
the tax treatment of royalty payments to identify the degree of substitutability 
between these sources of technology. The evidence from the actions of Ameri- 
can and foreign firms indicates that R&D responds to local tax rates, and that 
technology imports and local R&D are substitutes. The substitutability of these 
technologies carries numerous implications for the design of tax policy toward 
R&D, particularly when contrasted with the complementarity that is some- 
times thought to characterize their relationship. 
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